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Electricity reforms unfold as a redistribution of property rights under a new set of rules. 
These rules may or may not be consistent with the cultural beliefs of the country, its hu-
man capital endowment to implement and guide the reform process, the backing of the 
judiciary and other organizations to enforce the regulatory contract, and the active de-
fense of welfare gains by the coalitions of reform supporters. A reform is a deeply politi-
cal process in real time, with plenty of surprises and prone to mistakes and backlashes, as 
the “losers” may be long-lived and will keep continuous pressure to recover the rents or 
benefits they enjoyed under the previous regime.  
 
This study starts by presenting a collection of archetypical problems that became appar-
ent during the initial period of electricity reforms, stressing the incompleteness of the de-
fault approach to reform (change in ownership and incentive regulation). A broader con-
text to examine and design sustainable reforms is needed. The study presents a summary 
discussion of three new conceptual frameworks that are useful to analyze and design mi-
croeconomic reforms: the transaction-cost politics approach, the new institutional eco-
nomics and the new political economy. The transaction-cost approach puts forward the 
idea that an instantaneous switch to a first-best world is a chimera. A trade-off between 
the political feasibility of the reform and the elimination of rents is likely to exist. Multi-
ple interests will put the new order under contradictory pressures, thus reducing the scope 
of the original goals or altering their intended direction. Regulation encompasses much 
more than the rules of the game –which can be skewed, skipped or modified— and the 
regulatory office itself. The new institutional economics characterizes institutions as crys-
tallized beliefs. It stresses the support of customers and the role of complementary institu-
tions (the judiciary, the antitrust bodies, etc.) as the two ultimate pillars of reform sus-
tainability. Finally, the new political economy stresses the need of permanently assessing 
the net balance of political support at each instant of time so as to calibrate the depth of 
reform changes and its sequence.  
The report concludes with a list of themes that should be considered when designing elec-
tricity reforms. The author explicitly warns about the incompleteness of the proposal. 
This is an attempt to turn powerful economic ideas that are still in the making, into aids 
for project design. Further debate, reflection and experimentation should be pursued to 
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The evolution of reforms in the electricity sector 
is a fascinating topic needing permanent surveil-
lance and policy review. This document discusses 
and proposes a new framework to improve the 
quality of programs supporting such reforms in 
Latin America. A combination of three circum-
stances provided the genesis for this paper. 
Firstly, it responds to the risk that the reforms in 
the region might be reversed, which might origi-
nate in the lack of public support for privatization 
and the succession of crises and events in the re-
cent past (problems of supply in Chile and Brazil; 
price peaks in the spot market in El Salvador; the 
commercial unsustainability of the pool in Co-
lombia; the ENRON/Andersen scandal, and the 
Argentine crisis among others), that have pro-




Secondly, it responds to evidence that the consoli-
dation of sector reforms is not automatic, involv-
ing as it does the simultaneous creation of tradi-
tions of respect for the rights of investors and con-
sumers. Consolidation hinges less on formal 
changes than on the existence of an effective sys-
tem of social checks and balances. At the same 
time, it involves the mobilization of those interests 
that favor reform.  Consequently, those in charge 
of implementing reforms should understand the 
links between reform performance and the po-
litical management of the process. 
                                                           
1 Similar concerns are to be found in Lora and Panizza, 
2002. 
 
Finally, this paper partly builds upon the experi-
ence gathered from a project supporting the sus-
tainability of electricity reform in three countries 
(Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras), con-
ducted by the Sustainable Development Depart-
ment of the IDB in 2001 and 2002. These three 
case studies provide many examples of the ideas 
advanced here, thus facilitating the use of a con-
ceptual style.  
 
In this companion piece, the author is telling the 
interested reader things he (she) may find famil-
iar, with a bonus: a framework for reform de-
sign, incomplete yet ready for enrichment by 
further experience and debate. The next section 
of this report justifies the need to widen the con-
ceptual framework in the design of electricity 
sector reforms, based on a classification of ma-
jor institutional and political economy problems 
of electricity reforms observed so far. The third 
section gathers together some of the new contri-
butions from economic theory relevant to the 
study of institutional change. The last section 
presents a conceptual framework for designing 
and supporting reforms.  
  1Limitations of Reforms Reduced to  




In a nutshell, the recommendations to carry out 
microeconomic reforms worldwide during the 
nineties consisted of redistributing property rights 
(to remove politics from the management of tradi-
tionally public firms) and formulating new ground 
rules (introduction of competition and incentives). 





                                                          
Achievement of financial viability because the 
agents were responsible for profits and 
losses.
2 
Competition (especially in short-term genera-
tion markets) would produce efficient genera-
tion prices and reduce market power. 
The regulation of prices in natural monopolies 
would bring a reduction in transmission and 
distribution costs. 
 
If such conditions were met, private investors 
would be adequately remunerated, consumers 
would not pay excessive rents, and shifts in en-
ergy generation prices would stimulate investment 
in new plants.  
 
The reforms instituted (which, of course, varied 
according to the country in question) covered ar-
eas such as regulation of the sector; changes in the 
ownership of firms (privatization); ending vertical 
integration; promoting competition and free entry 
in generation; setting prices through spot market 
competition; and regulating prices in transmission 
and distribution bottlenecks.  
 
These recommendations stemmed from two im-
portant advances in economics that took place in 
the 1980s; namely, research on  the impact of the 
structure of property rights on the decisions and 
behavior of firms, and the theory of incentive-
based mechanism design. Ideally, privatization 
would bring an end to political control over firms, 
yielding reductions in costs and efficient prices. 
These theories are by no means erroneous, but 
their impact depends on each country’s specific 
context, particularly on the inertial effects of 
customary ways of doing things and the persis-
tence of political interests. A partial listing of the 
types of problems that arose during the imple-
mentation of reforms appears below. 
 
                                                          
2 It should not be forgotten that the practical reason 
behind the reform of public services in Latin America 
was the lack of financial viability of most publicly-
owned companies in the region. 
 
Initial changes tend to be erratic. Reformers do 
not possess unlimited powers or capabilities, but 
they may certainly have their own agenda. De-
fining the new rules of the game comes about in 
the midst of negotiations between different in-
terest groups. All reform laws tend to involve 
compromises and distortions imposed by coali-
tions with veto powers. The reformer —or more 
exactly, the consultants involved— can propose 
measures that can have results contrary to those 
desired. An example is the performance of bid-
based pools in which the predicted price compe-
tition never materialized.
3 Another is the mecha-
nism for setting final consumer prices in the 
Californian market, which impeded the pass-
through of generation prices (and led to the 
bankruptcy of distributors in 2000 when prices 
rose out of a combination of scarcity and market 
power in generation). 
 
The new rules can be ignored, manipulated or 
changed. Even in the hypothetical case of formal 
changes that are wholly in line with the expecta-
tions of reformers, real world implementation 
depends on the regulator’s capabilities;
4 the pos-
 
3 Price competition in a pool is difficult when there 
are different technologies (thermal generation versus 
hydroelectric),  must-run plants (those needing to 
generate continuously), and transmission network 
constraints. At a deeper level, price competition may 
not occur at all when incumbents make strategic use 
of long-term contracts. 
4 Lack of human capital means that new regulators 
will have lower average skills than their predeces-
sors, which reduces the capacity and autonomy of the 
institution. The problem is made worse if there is a 
high turnover of regulators (so that firms have a bet-
  2sibility of verifying outlawed practices;
5 the sup-
port of the judiciary and anti-trust institutions 
(where these exist);
6 and basic societal beliefs 
about what should happen to those who break the 
rules.
7 In sum, the legitimacy of and compliance 
with norms are endogenous. 
 
Ex ante competition is insufficient to eliminate 
rents. Political cycles tend to change the return on 
investments. Privatization tenders, even when 
there is no manipulation, can be used to buy the 
option to renegotiate more favorable conditions ex 
post in countries with a weak judiciary (especially 
when the criterion for divestment is to gain the 




The incentives proposed by the regulator may not 
be credible. The theory of contracts that may en-
courage firms to reveal truthful information or to 
increase efficiency, implicitly assumes that just a 
single strategic interaction exists between the 
regulator (principal) and firms (agents). In prac-
tice, the power of incentives is diminished by, 
among other things, the repetition of interactions 
between principal and agents, regulatory risk and 
the appearance of lasting coalitions among agents. 
Regulated firms understand that rents arising from 
asymmetric information can disappear even be-
fore the second tariff revision (in the case of dis-
tributors), once they accept to reveal truthful 
information. In addition, political considerations 
may lead the regulator to modify the price caps 
to the final consumer before the tariff revision. 
This reduces the incentive to introduce better 
technologies to reduce costs, as was the case in 
the British market when OFFER was still in ex-
istence. When regulation is highly detailed and 
complex and when uncertainty over short-term 
prices is high, agents have incentives to coordi-
nate how they behave toward the regulator. In 
such cases, policies intended to encourage com-
petitive efforts lose their effectiveness.
9  
                                                                                          
                                                          
ter understanding of the norms than the regulators 
themselves).  
5 There is an abundant literature on strategic behavior 
in the British market when it was dominated by two 
large generators, with the regulator –(despite its techni-
cal capacity and the coherence between its objectives 
and those of the competition control authority) remit-
ting no more than a handful of cases for investigation. 
6 In Colombia, for example, the courts view with hos-
tility the idea of regulation as delegation. 
7 If the public has little trust in the courts because they 
are seen to defend powerful interests, opportunistic 
firms will win the concessions for privatization. Beliefs 
thus become self-fulfilling prophecies. Benavides and 
Fainboim (2002) discuss the relationship between be-
liefs and enforcement in highway concessions in Co-
lombia. 
8 Influential firms have been observed to use their ad-
vantages to gain bids for tenders and then to push for a 
change in remuneration once the contract is settled. 
This is more common among firms de novo in situa-
tions where property rights are poorly delineated and 
where there is corruption (Hellman, Jones and Kauf-
mann, 2000). 
 
The social context reduces the range of viable 
regulatory instruments. In the case of electricity, 
the threat of government intervention to cap 
prices means that investors in generation antici-
pate that the right to receive quasi-rents during 
times of excess demand does not apply. This 
will lead them to ask for additional payments 
(capacity payments fulfill this role) to comple-
ment their income. Entry of new plants could be 
a very opaque process when public tenders have 
multiple purposes (“beauty contests”) or when 
competition is bypassed and discretionary deci-
sions are justified on the basis of having to deal 
with economic or sector crises. Due to the politi-
cization of the service, distribution firms may 
fail to honor payments for wholesale energy (as 
they cannot easily disconnect their clients in ar-
rears). Financial viability is not automatic, even 
in the case of private firms.  
 
This sample of problems illustrates the tension 
that exists between what is desirable and what is 
practicable in electricity regulation. The com-
plexity of regulation makes it necessary to de-
sign programs that give greater weight to sup-
porting the process once it is under way.
 
9 For example, bidding into the pool and contracting 
strategies tend to “bunch” by generating technology 
type. 
  3Economic Theory Developments Useful for  




THE TRANSACTION COST  
POLITICS APPROACH 
 
In proposing the analytical framework of transac-
tion cost politics, Dixit (1996) argues that the 
scope and presence of transaction costs are more 
marked in political relations than economic ones, 
since political agreements cannot be made con-
tractually enforceable. In the best of cases, non-
compliance of a political promise in a democratic 
society can be punished by means of the less-than-
perfect tool of the ballot box. 
 
The design of economic policies is characterized 
by the presence of asymmetric information and 
limited possibilities of commitment, this being 
precisely the nexus in which the regulation of 
public services takes place. The central conclu-
sions of Dixit (1996) are so simple as to seem triv-
ial: the political process is a real-time game in 
conditions that are uncertain and changing, with 
many participants (principals) trying to influence 
the actions of the policy designer (agent). It is a 
process that is constrained by history, social habits 
and the collective memory, as well as being full of 
surprises for everyone. The  resulting equilibrium 
in the game of policy design typically does not 
maximize anything. Attempts to identify a “truly 
optimal” policy are destined to fail, since no great 
results should be expected from any particular 
organizational form.  
 
The changes that are feasible may therefore be 
modest. To understand this point, it is useful to 
remember how approaches on the role of eco-
nomic policy evolved, along with the recom-
mended policy interventions in each case. The 
normative approach, which predominated up until 
the 1980s, contended that markets and govern-
ment were equally efficient. The role of govern-
ment was to remedy market failures (in regulatory 
terms this meant preventing the exercise of mo-
nopoly market power), to produce public goods 
and to redistribute income. The implicit assump-
tion was that the government in question was 
perfect and would maximize welfare. 
 
In this way, policy design turned into a problem 
of optimization, subject to technology con-
straints and feasible government action. This 
was the contribution of the theory of the “sec-
ond-best,” exemplified in the work of Ramsey 




When the informational limitations of policy 
designers became clear, regulation was posed as 
the solution to a problem of incentives between 
agents (the firms regulated) and a principal (the 
regulator). The impressive theoretical contribu-
tion of Baron and Myerson (1982) —the possi-
bility of offering a monopolist a menu of pay-
ments calibrated to reveal its real cost— boosted 
confidence in discovering the social optimum 
restricted by information. The rules of the game 
would be freely defined by the principal and ap-
plied by agents who would behave strategically 
just within the realm of such rules. The pres-
sures in other social dimensions that influence 
the outcome of the game are not mentioned. In 
other words, the context would be one of politi-
cal vacuum. Hardly surprisingly, regulation did 
not turn into “incentive engineering” because 
both the degree of application of rules and their 
change are part of the game. The rules are de-
termined in a larger social context with more 
players and unknown strategies for the mecha-
nism designer.  
 
In the previous section, we referred to the falli-
bility of policy designers, their involvement as 
interested parties, the intervention of contradic-
tory interests in designing the rules, and the pos-
sibility that formal policy is either not applied or 
                                                           
10 It is illustrative to remember that Boiteaux, one of 
the main proponents of this school, was never able to 
introduce this proposal in Electricité de France, 
where he worked. 
  4is interpreted in ways that run contrary to its 
original spirit. Dixit (1996) summarizes such con-
siderations about the evolution of policy design 
paradigms, saying that the starting point was the 
supposition that the government is an omnipotent, 
omniscient and benevolent dictator. The work on 
the “second-best” scotched the hypothesis of om-
nipotence. The results on asymmetric information 
got rid of that of omniscience. Policy negotiation 
in real time shows there is no dictator, and casts 




If the transaction cost of politics is worked out, a 
regulatory system is efficient if it passes the 
remediableness  test posited by Williamson 
(1996), according to which “an outcome for which 
no feasible superior alternative can be described 
and implemented with net gains is presumed to be 
efficient.” This test is important in defining the 
type of initial regulatory arrangements for each 
country and how they evolve. Williamson illus-
trates this point with the principle of “inefficiency 
by design.” Political property rights are particu-
larly insecure in democratic regimes in which the 
measures defined by one generation of rulers are 
reversed by the next (Moe, 1990). If what is pro-
posed is a system of regulation that aims to elimi-
nate all and every existing rents at a stroke, it will 
be vulnerable and easy to reverse. Despite the 
good intentions of policy designers, over time 
there has to be an inter-temporal trade-off be-
tween the rents acceptable to initiate the change 
and the continuity of the original measures. With 
no alternatives, this intentionally inefficient de-
sign passes the test of remediableness. 
 
THE ROLE OF BELIEFS IN  
THE LIFE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
In his pioneering work, North (1990) defines insti-
tutions as rules of the game or constraints de-
signed to intermediate human interactions. Al-
though this definition has helped to appreciate the 
importance of institutions in economic life, it is 
insufficient for the design of institutional 
changes. Greif (1994) notes how, in North’s 
definition, the rules of the game represent a spe-
cial type of constraint on behavior. Unlike 
North, he suggests that institutions are non-
technological constraints on human interactions. 
Greif’s great contribution is to show that institu-
tions are made up of two interrelated elements. 
First, institutions are at once organizations that 
appear for endogenous reasons, and cultural be-
liefs, that is, how individuals expect others to act 
in varying contingencies. Second, institutions —
if they are lasting— operate in a sort of “equilib-
rium.” 
                                                           
11 Laffont (2000) suggests that the economists who 
pretend to be benevolent in recommending policies 
cannot be taken seriously by the rest of society, since 
such an affirmation contradicts their model in which all 
other agents act in a selfish manner. 
 
One of the simplest institutions (in the sense that 
no organization is required) is the reputation 
built on repeated interactions. The reputation 
mechanism illustrates the existence of voluntary 
restrictions that make formal rules unnecessary, 
and raises the question as to why such rules 
emerge and when they are observed. The range 
of situations in which beliefs sustain social be-
havior patterns is very wide. We can cite two 
examples from Basu (2000): the possibility of 
having tyrannies without tyrants and the self-
fulfilling prophecy that hoarders and speculators 
are obnoxious. 
 
In his first example, Basu discusses a situation 
where a person is considered disloyal to the ty-
rant if either he does not cooperate or if he main-
tains relations with someone who is disloyal, 
where individuals believe that no one else would 
dare to be disloyal; and where there are negative 
net payments involved in being disloyal –(the 
cost of exclusion) even if disloyalty brings no 
direct punishment from the tyrant. The regime 
maintains itself by mutual suspicion among the 
population, there being no need for the tyrant. In 
his second example, Basu comments on the gen-
eral sense of revulsion generated by hoarders 
and speculators. Why are they obnoxious, even 
though they increase social welfare? That they 
are obnoxious is a self-fulfilling belief. A possi-
ble explanation is that in a society where the 
predominant view is that speculators are obnox-
ious, only those who have great love for money 
are prepared to suffer the opprobrium of being 
perceived that way. These examples illustrate 
two characteristics of the dynamic of beliefs: (i) 
  5a recursive mechanism of social transmission is 
required, and (ii) some costly signals can make a 
perception progressively more permanent.
12 
 
Would it be realistic to regulate without norms? In 
practice, any reform is inserted into a nexus of 
political power and requires articulation with the 
existing legal order. The decision of creating addi-
tional organisms to administer and enforce the 
new rules depends on the gains to be achieved 
applying resources (if they exist) to compiling, 
processing and disseminating information or en-
forcing contracts as the social network expands 
(Aoki, 2000). 
 
Many combinations of rules and transactions seem 
to yield similar regulatory outcomes, ex ante. Ba-
sic game theory is unable to determine which in-
stitution will be observed in reality, since its ap-
plication throws multiple equilibria. On the other 
hand, in practice, there are identical mechanisms 
that, if transplanted  —to use the language em-
ployed by Buscaglia and Ratliff (2000)— to dif-
ferent societies, will develop along very different 
lines. The use of game theory with an evolution-
ary approach, in combination with empirical ele-
ments (contextual comparisons and historical in-
formation), may help us understand the emer-
gence of institutions and their dynamics. We will 
return to this point when we discuss the choice 
between “big bang” and gradual approaches to 
reform. 
 
Among the factors that drive institutional adjust-
ment is the limited capacity of economic agents to 
process information and to infer all the rules of 
the game and their consequences. With hindsight, 
we can see that this is what happened with the 
restructuring of the gas and electricity market in 
the United Kingdom. The radical change in mar-
ket architecture and governance there (from a 
bid-based pool with centralized dispatch to a 
market of bilateral and voluntary contracts, 
along with the merger of the regulatory bodies 
of electricity and gas, OFFER and OFGAS, to 
form OFGEM) is an attempt to manage the unin-
tended or unforeseen consequences of the origi-
nal design; namely, the persistence of market 
power exercise in generation and the weakness 
of OFFER.  
                                                           
12 In the case of regulation, the population should per-
ceive that the increased cost of a service is offset by 
tangible benefits (for example, freeing up fiscal re-
sources and using them to provide social services). It 
should be anticipated that changing beliefs about the 
benefits of a regulatory reform could operate under loss 
aversion conditions documented in experimental stud-
ies on decision-making under uncertainty (the popula-
tion may be risk-loving over regulatory losses and risk-
averse over regulatory gains at the same time). This 
would explain, in part, the unfavorable perceptions of 
reform documented in opinion surveys like those of 
Latinobarómetro, even in situations where there are 
positive gains. 
Aoki (2001) argues that the participants provide 
an incomplete, simplified and inexact represen-
tation of the interactions in any social domain 
(called  subjective game model). When the ac-
tions of the players, based on their subjective 
model become consistent after a series of inter-
actions, the reality observed –(jointly created by 
those actions) becomes stable and can be repro-
duced. An institution appears as the common 
part of the subjective model for (almost) all 
players. An institution is, then, a shared belief 
about the structure of the game.  
 
How do we reach such a consistent position? 
While the actions derived from the subjective 
models yield results worse than those expected 
by the participants, the conflict of perceptions 
will continue, driving the search for new subjec-
tive game models until, eventually, an equilib-
rium is reached. For example, in the Colombian 
wholesale market, the hydroelectric generators 
experimented until they reached a common 
strategy: selling most of their firm’s energy 
through long-term contracts and biding into the 
pool lower than the strike value of such con-
tracts. So they generated their contracted energy 
or purchased at very low prices whenever they 
were in short position. Additionally, the low 
spot prices kept their fuel-fired competitors out 
of dispatch. Without doubt, such behavior is not 
the most profitable in times of drought. But it is 
an institutional equilibrium because it solved a 
very problematic coordination problem. 
 
Like Greif, Aoki does not identify an institution 
as an organization (a public authority, the regu-
lator or different collective actors) or as con-
  6straints on behavior (rules, norms or social codes). 
What is distinctive about Aoki’s proposal is the 
reduction in the complexity on the part of those 
agents who are unwilling or unable to infer the 
rules and payments of a game in detail; informa-
tion becomes compressed and viewed syntheti-
cally. The structure of the game is a function of 
those shared beliefs about the results of repeated 
actions and interactions. Those beliefs can vary 
from one place to another or through time, even 
when the organizations or the formal  restrictive 
elements are the same. Differing beliefs give rise 
to differing institutional game structures. 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF REFORM 
 
An important decision in any reform is the order 
and speed of the measures that are introduced. 
Shock therapy (“big bang”) involves all the re-
quired changes taking place at the same time, 
while a gradual approach involves the measures 
being taken separately and over time. The studies 
on reform dynamics mostly focus on macroeco-
nomic reform and trade liberalization (Tommasi 
and Velasco, 1996), and implicitly presuppose the 
existence of rational agents, a system of law that 
applies infallibly, and institutions that appear exo-
genously at the beginning of the game and remain 
invariable throughout it. Effort is concentrated in 
understanding the way in which agents adjust 
their behavior when faced with an external change 
within the framework of conventional game the-
ory. These studies provide information on matters 
such as the relation between the identity of the 
reformers and the sequence of the measures, or 
the relation between the impossibility of commit-
ment and shock therapy, for instance.
13 
                                                           
                                                                                      
13 Tommasi and Velasco (1996) argue that a radical 
reform has better chances of success if it is driven by a 
leader with the background of a moderate or even one 
of opposition to the philosophy of reform. In this case, 
the consistent strategy would be first to introduce those 
reforms that most damage his electoral base. Rodrik 
(1989) suggests that a reformer with low credibility 
should exceed himself in his zeal to drive forward a 
reform that is wider ranging than that necessary to 
build a reputation (“conversion” syndrome). This idea 
is taken further by Martinelli and Tommasi (1997), 
who suggest that when governments cannot pre-
commit and there are groups with veto powers, only 
the most radical reforms are likely to succeed. Because 
of the high risk of reversal, such strategies require a 
great deal of evaluation in context before they are 
applied. 
There are refined political economy models of 
reform that endogenize the sequence of meas-
ures according to their complementarity over 
time or the possibility of organizing support coa-
litions to help each stage. In Dewatripont and 
Roland (1995), the gradual approach is prefer-
able where there is uncertainty about the results 
of reform, about the costs of getting it wrong 
(higher in the case of “big bang”), and where the 
suggested measures reinforce themselves at each 
step. Wei’s model (1997) relates the sequencing 
of measures with the conditions that support 
them at each stage. Wei also shows that, in some 
circumstances, it is politically impossible to im-
plement a “big bang” reform, but possible to 
carry out the entire reform package with a strat-
egy of “divide and rule” over time.
14 
 
Although such models involve multiple stages, 
they do not examine the possibility of changing 
beliefs and of increasing management capacities 
in order to accelerate the transition from one 
regulatory regime to another. The challenge of 
designing and supporting reforms is to imple-
ment feasible reforms that pass Williamson’s 
remediableness test thus allowing for the possi-
bility of them being deepened; and craft transi-
tion strategies toward superior equilibria.
15 The 
non-institutional models just discussed are help-
ful in eliminating unfeasible alternatives to re-
form (even where agents are perfectly rational 
and where there is perfect rule enforcement) and 
in introducing the discipline of detailed political 
coalition analysis at each stage of reform. 
 
History plays its part in defining the structure of 
the regulatory game, because agents have 
bounded rationality and form beliefs partly by 
trial and error, but particularly by examining the 
lessons of past experience (Kreps, 1990). The 
evolution of institutions is “path-dependent.” 
Every path involves the selection, among many, 
of an institutional choice to solve a given prob-
 
14 In the best style of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. 
15 By superiority we mean the reduction of the costs 
of  direct  intervention of those interested to defend 
their interests, possibly by means of delegation to 
specialized organizations. 
  7lem. Along this path, a group of institutions ap-
pear in other domains of social and economic in-
teraction that co-evolve and mutually reinforce 
each other. 
 
Bounded rationality implies that reaching an equi-
librium between beliefs and rules may take time. 
This eventually happens when agents’ strategies 
are resistant to invasions or, in other words, the 
strategies are evolutionary stable.
16 With regard to 
the issue of institutional complementarity, path-
dependence generates in turn interlocking be-
tween institutions operating in different domains. 
Institutional complementarity has two faces. On 
the one hand, it is not easy to assemble a radical 
reform in stages if each partial change requires 
capacities in other institutions that do not exist, or 
even worse if each partial reform contradicts the 
overall prevailing institutional philosophy. This is 
especially risky when instruments are transplanted 
from different legal systems. On the other hand, 
paradoxically, complementarity may assist the 
transition to a high-quality regulatory regime by 
means of a percolation process, which is discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
The basic result on the dynamics of interrelated 
institutions is called the momentum theorem (Mil-
grom, Qian and Roberts, 1991) whose content is 
illustrated as follows. In country X there exist 
only two political economy domains: the provi-
sion of public services and the courts. The first 
domain may be observed in two states: financially 
feasible vs. unfeasible tariffs. The second domain 
may exhibit either high or low law enforcement. 
It turns out that country X lives in the worst pos-
sible world: public utility tariffs are unfeasible 
and the law is poorly enforced. The two social 
groups with the highest stakes at tariffs and en-
forcement are employees and backward indus-
tries, respectively. Employees prefer subsidized 
tariffs and backward industries extract rents 
from weak enforcement via, for example, high 
transaction costs for potential industry entrants. 
Both groups forecast their gains taking into ac-
count the effect of institutional performance. 
                                                           
16 Evolutionary game theory does not presuppose per-
fect rationality on the part of agents, and has been in-
corporated as a tool of institutional analysis by Aoki. 
Chapters 7 and 11 of Gintis (2000) introduce this the-
ory briefly.  
 
The application of the momentum theorem to 
country X says that a transition to higher en-
forcement could induce financially feasible pub-
lic utility tariffs. For this to happen it is neces-
sary that employees perceive net gains from the 
externalities created by the change in enforce-
ment. Higher law enforcement may lead to better 
public utility management and possibly to higher 
tariffs, which are surely perceived as an in-
creased cost for employees. On the other hand, 
enforcement could generate benefits that com-
pensate such costs in excess (for example, by 
entry of new industries providing more em-
ployment opportunities). Another possibility is 
that a sustained accumulation of best practices in 
enforcement may become impossible to ignore 
in the domain of public utilities, inducing the 
belief that things can change for the better. The 
reader who suspects that there may be an institu-
tional “free lunch” should reflect on the cost of 
building capabilities and shaping beliefs, the 
motor of the transitions we have mentioned.  




There are some empirical lessons and applications 
of the principles discussed that should be consid-




1.  The introduction of a reform sets in motion 
(or better, is the continuation of) a process 
that includes not only the definition of rules, 
but also their application and change. A re-
form is an inherently political process. The re-
former runs a great risk if his (her) efforts are 
focused only on defining the regulatory tech-
nology. Support actions should include not 
just the regulator but also complementary in-
stitutions like the courts and antitrust bodies, 
as well as key actors in the balance of forces.  
 
2.  Credibility is the only asset of a regulator. 
Credibility cannot be built if rules are not en-
forced or the regulator loses the conceptual 
and legal disputes he (she) goes for. The regu-
lator should not carry the burden of supervi-
sory tasks beyond his (her) capacity.  
 
3.  The inefficiency introduced by the political 
process is related to the credibility of com-
promises. The design challenge is to suggest 
solutions in contexts and on issues where po-
litical compromise is not feasible either be-
cause the regulator lacks the interest or politi-
cal capital to lead the change, or because there 
is a lack of trained personnel to administer 
and enforce a system of high-powered incen-
tives, or because popular support for reform is 
low. There is no such thing as independent 
regulators in public services, as regulation is 
just another venue for policy making. 
 
4.  It is crucial to understand the origin and 
forces nurturing cultural beliefs if we are to 
evaluate whether the introduction of a reform 
is consistent with the technological constraints 
(market structure), the traditions of redis-
tributive politics, and the availability of hu-
man and organizational resources required 
to sustain it. In cases of extreme institutional 
weakness and small markets with very few 
players, it may be better to proceed stepwise 
to avoid opening a Pandora’s box. 
                                                           
17 These lessons are especially critical for reforms in 
small electricity markets. See Millán and Vives, 2001. 
 
5.  It is prudent to use simple instruments (for 
example, limits on vertical integration or 
horizontal concentration) instead of theoreti-
cally more efficient rules when high-
powered incentive mechanisms can be ma-
nipulated and the regulator is weak. It is to 
keep in mind the high costs of collecting and 
processing the information necessary to 
identify behavioral changes. Complexity 
tends to yield erratic results in courts that ei-
ther do not share the regulatory philosophy 
or are just inept. It is also prudent to reduce 
the number of disputes decided upon a logic 
that is hostile to the reform process.  
 
6.  Shock measures can be effective on struc-
ture (as was the case with atomized property 
in the Argentine generation industry, where 
there were observable changes in conduct), 
but less certainly so on architecture (mecha-
nisms of price formation). This might be be-
cause of the lack of human resources to 
carry out regulation, cultural and commer-
cial traditions, weak institutions and, above 
all, the legacy of redistributive policy. 
 
7.  It is now clear the harm done by reforms 
that started with a competitive market with 
two or three generators and without con-
straints to vertical re-integration. The temp-
tation to allow vertical integration should be 
resisted, at least where it is not absolutely 
necessary owing to the small financial scale 
of operations, high risk of hold up, or re-
strictions over the number of potential inves-
tors in the country concerned. 
 
9 8.  An institution established for a specific pur-
pose can gradually take on a life of its own, 
changing its mission in practical terms. De-
tailed regulation (which is never complete be-
cause it ends in casuistry) discourages in-
vestment since it destabilizes the rules of re-
muneration. Property rights end up being 
threatened by the very entity whose job it is to 
build credibility in a new order. Once a regu-
lator has decided to carry out its functions in a 
“heavy-handed” style, it is difficult to go back 
to a “light-handed” one: regulators will usu-
ally accept changes that improve the status 
quo but will resist those that undermine the 
tactical advantages achieved by this sort of 
style. 
 
9.  The introduction of a regulatory scheme that 
takes advantage of a crisis or other window of 
opportunity may serve as the focal point from 
which to begin a transition toward a new insti-
tutional equilibrium. Taking advantage of 





Euphoria, arising from a confusion of the 
reform with the changes in organization 
and norms. It can be misleadingly simple 
to introduce a specialized regulatory sys-
tem whose effect hinges on conceptual 
consistency between, for instance, the 
regulator, the courts and anti-trust agen-
cies. Where such consistency and mutual 
support is weak, the system will collapse 
or will have functional problems. A case 
that merits careful review is the electricity 
sector reform in El Salvador, where a 
generation architecture inspired by the 
Scandinavian Nord Pool was introduced, 
but with a small number of firms, without 
any prohibition against vertical integra-
tion and without any judicial traditions of 
anti-trust. Formal modifications can lead 
to a reform, but do not constitute institu-
tions themselves. The ease with which 
changes are brought in can be attributable 
to a range of factors, such as, for instance, 
the creation of new interests that are able 
skillfully to foster and shape the process, 
or the failure of anti-reform interests to 
coordinate their opposition in the short 
term. Where the latter is the case and the 
reform constitutes a provocation to 
which they are unable to respond, the 
long-term damage caused by reversion 
may be very high. Finally, a reform can 
be accepted in a syncretic way (just as 
was the case with the afro descendants 
who accepted the Catholic calendar of 
saints in praying to their original dei-
ties). In such circumstances, the new re-
gime is only a disguised version of the 
old order, constituted for the sake of ap-
pearances. 
Pessimism, when the conditions for car-
rying on an important change are over-
stated.  Usually the opportunities that 
arise are insufficient to introduce a ma-
jor change in one go, or where they ap-
pear but there is no urgent demand from 
those likely to benefit (who may be en-
joying high subsidies, for example). 
When the reformer lacks an entrepre-
neurial spirit and takes no risks, it be-
comes a question of waiting on events, 
whether positive systematic shocks or 
the collapse of the existing system. The 
budding reformer has to ask 
him(her)self, then, whether or not 
he(she) has an overly ambitious regula-
tory model in mind; or whether or not 
the reform is his(her) political priority. 
 
Nothing that we have discussed or proposed 
would have much sense if there was no potential 
to move toward a superior equilibrium in cir-
cumstances where sector reform seems to lack 
positive convictions or where the institutional 
context is weak. The reformer has to solve a 
two-stage dynamic program. It seems that the 
first stage shall always consist of building on the 
political capital of the reformer so as to reach a 
new workable order. The path toward a new 
equilibrium would then branch in two different 
directions, depending on the outcome of the first 
stage.  
 
Where the reform produces exemplary results 
that encourage the mobilization of interests. In 
this case, institutional strengthening might prove 
self-financing since the political capital invested 
by the reformer would transform itself into a 
  10political willingness to defend the achievements 
(second stage). If the new system of checks and 
balances resists attempts by entrenched interests 
from the previous regime to reverse it, one could 
then pass (third stage) to a greater use of special-
ized organizations and formal rules. This path of 
action would free up social resources devoted to 
the “self-defense” of property rights. Delegated 
bodies would defend customary rights once the 
organizational capabilities developed. The limit-
ing factors in this trajectory are the ability to 
channel the mobilization of positive interests and 
the formation of the human capital required to 
administer and enforce the rules. 
 
Where sectoral reform produces insufficient bene-
fits  to  change   beliefs.  The sustainedstrengthen-
ing of capabilities in institutions that complement 
electricity regulation (the justice system, contract, 
anti-trust bodies, regulation of other services in 
networks) can create precedents that percolate 
through the practice of electricity regulation (sec-
ond stage). This indirect route to-
ward regulation by momentum  would appear 
when qualified manpower is in short supply and 
electricity is not a key factor in economic policy 
(or its political economy is very sensitive). The 
transition to high-quality organizations (third 
stage) will arise once there is manpower capable 
of administering the regulatory processes in-
volved. The limiting factors on this second tra-
jectory are the speed at which the rest of the in-
stitutions can be strengthened and sufficient 
manpower trained. Multisector regulation may 
speed up the formation of human capital, as well 
as reducing the risk of regulatory capture.
18  
 
The dynamics described so far may be shown à 
la Krugman (1996). Figure 1 shows the response 
of government (public commitment) for every 
level of social support to the reform (curve P-P) 
and the response of society to every level of 
public commitment to the reform (curve S-S). 
Each curve is S shaped. The two possible equi-
libria (inferior and superior) are labeled with 
circles.  











                                                           
18 On this, it is worth reading the article by Aubert 
and Laffont, 2001. A reform starting at the inferior equilibrium with 
insufficient public or social support will not take 
off, as indicated by the arrows in the diagram. Ac-
cording to the discussion above, two positive 
things could happen: increased social support 
(figure 2) and strengthening of state capacity (fig-
ure 3). 
 
In each pure case the response curves shift 
(toward S’-S’ and P’-P’, respectively) until the 
inferior equilibrium disappears. Despite the 
extreme simplification, these diagrams are use-
ful to analyse the approximate dynamic of re-
forms as a function of the status quo, the pro-
posed measures and the reaction of partici-
pants. 












Figure 3. Institutional Change Based on Strengthening of State Capacity 
Public commitment to 
reform
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